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Abstracts 
High emphasis on the profit and loss and the net profit has motivated the management to manipulate 
the company's activities in order to achieve the target profit and consequently created the concept of 
earnings management. On the other hand, according to uncertainty to reduce the likelihood of losses 
and better illustrate organizational performance researchers examined a new method as managerial 
caution.  This issue is more important at the stock exchanges. Therefore, this study aimed to investi-
gate the effect of managerial caution on real earnings management. For this purpose and in order to 
survey hypotheses after screening, 118 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE), in the 
period of 2009 to 2013, were studied. The results showed that there is a significant negative relation-
ship between managerial caution and real earnings management. This means that, in that period, the 
companies that have benefited from precautions management show less interest to use real earnings 
management actions and it has shown that using managerial caution leads to reduce the use of earn-
ings management. 
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Introduction 
In the economic environment, uncertainty and unreliability about the occur-
rence of a particular event causes different expectations. As in competitive 
environment of the capital market, companies search to achieve and main-
tain reputation and to develop in this environment. This matter is not 
achieved only with the growing functioning. Therefore, managers are al-
ways seeking to improve their performance and show better results of their 
organizations. Prior research results introduced earnings management as a 
way for managers to reach the target performance. In new researches, a new 
approach in the earnings management, under the managerial caution, has 
been studied. Two mechanisms in economics to explain the precautionary 
measures include: Investment authority in capital assets and precautionary 
savings. Based on the theory of investors in capital assets, cautious manag-
ers by postponing to decisions making until elimination of uncertainty, react 
to uncertainty. Related research has shown that damping and stability of 
earnings are indicatives of its quality and therefore, investors with more 
confidence, invest in the stock of companies which have more stable profit-
ability. Considering the importance of this issue, the use of earnings man-
agement tool can be considered as a way to favorable picture of the financial 
condition of the company and accomplished through management interven-
tion in the process of determining the profits (Noorvash et al., 2005). Given 
the above, this study sought to examine the impact of managerial discretion 
on the real earnings management. In other words, this study has been exam-
ined the managers’ use of precaution activities impact on real earnings man-
agement and lead to reduce real earnings management by them or not. 
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Theoretical Foundations 
Managerial caution 
Caution means the tendency and willingness to make decisions to take pre-
cautionary measures and preventive in the face of uncertainty conditions. 
The meaning of uncertainty is the probability of occurrence of a specified 
event in a state of possible scenarios. Since uncertainty is an integral part of 
any economic environment, one should be look for a way to reduce the ad-
verse effect of uncertainty. One of the things that can be done in the face of 
uncertainty is caution. At the most basic level, the decision maker can do 
two precautions actions: (i) postponing decisions making, at least until that 
uncertainty is resolved to some extent; and (ii) deliberate reduction of dis-
cretionary spending, to increase precautionary savings. On the other hand, 
most of the companies' attempt is to maintain their financial positions and 
cash flows to reduce or maintain the recruitment of personnel, investment in 
capital assets and discretionary expenses (Hsihe et al., 2012). Bloom (2009) 
argues that companies in response to an uncertainty reduce their payable 
salary. In fact, companies in the face of uncertainty significantly increase 
precautionary savings and the only way to achieve this goal is to reduce dis-
cretionary spending. Two mechanisms in economics to explain the precau-
tionary measures include: (i) Investment authority in capital assets, and (ii) 
precautionary savings. 
The first mechanism to explain the managerial caution is the mecha-
nism of investment authority in capital assets. Changing the attitude due to 
economic changes and increasing complexity related activities, lead to a 
new approach in financial and economic decisions named investment au-
thority in capital assets. This approach is based on the complexity of deci-
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sion-making in an uncertain situation in which, determining the expectations 
of future changes plays a vital role in the view of the uncertainty. The high-
est application of investment authority in capital assets is investment deci-
sion making or valuation of the activities in the area that have higher risks. 
The second mechanism to explain the managerial caution is precautionary 
savings mechanism. According to some scholars, savings means buying 
stocks or participation in a retirement program as well, but saving has only 
one meaning for economists that include: Taking less than a fixed amount of 
resources at present, more consumption in the future. Savings is considered 
as to postpone making any decisions of consumption and saving the de-
ferred consumption in an asset framework. In fact, precautionary savings is 
an additional saving that occurs as a result of knowing the uncertain future 
(Carroll & Kimball, 2006). 
 
Real Earnings Management  
Income statement, due to provision of useful information about the profita-
bility of business units, is important for financial information users. The im-
portance of the accounting income for the users of financial information has 
caused business unit management pay special attention to the amount and 
method of preparation and presentation. Therefore, there is always a con-
cern that profits as one of the most important indicators of financial perfor-
mance, are managed by managers who are in conflicts with ordinary share-
holders with particular purposes. Earnings management can be defined as 
the choice of accounting practices by administrator or actions affecting prof-
it to achieve a certain personal amount (target profit). 
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Earnings management can be done based on accrual anomaly or real 
action. Earnings management by taking advantage of accrual anomaly and 
accounting basics is called artificial earnings management and earnings 
management by taking advantage of real actions is called real earnings 
management. In artificial earnings management, management through dis-
cretionary accruals such as storage by reducing the value of inventory, re-
structuring reserves and other accrual anomaly or by using the principles 
and procedures of accounting, such as choosing between different methods 
of depreciation, pay to arrangement of accounting numbers according to 
their own desire and to manage profit to achieve the profit target (Nazemi 
ardekani, 2009). In another form that earnings management happens by 
management through items and real action, managers are not involved in 
accounting choices. In this case, through making change in the structure and 
timing of transactions and activities (including operations, investment and 
financing), or otherwise, management manipulates real financial events and 
manages the earnings. Controlling and management the real variables, such 
as research and development expenditures, overproduction and develop-
ment, timing of purchase and withdrawal of capital assets are examples of 
actions that management used the actual earnings. Following the Enron 
scandal and the failure of WorldCom and approval of new laws such as Sar-
banes Oxley, earnings management cost increased through using accounting 
variables and this expectation is that administrators use to manage interest 
on their real variables (Karami et al., 2011). In this research, the second 
form of earnings management has been studied is real earnings manage-
ment, on which the impact of managerial caution is investigated. 
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Given that managerial caution in organizations to reduce the risk of 
loss and is done in response to uncertainty in the economic environment and 
where managers to postpone investment decisions making on assets, reduce 
discretionary expenses and stop or reduce hire employees to uncertainty and 
activities leads the results of the organization's performance to its desired 
position, so it is expected to take precautions through the mentioned factors 
leading to decreased desire and real earnings management in companies that 
do care management. 
 
Table 1. Some of the most important related research 
Key findings Purpose Author(s) 
(Year) 
A significant level of earnings management hap-
pens in different industries which is predictable 
by multilayer perceptron neural networks ap-
proach. 
Prediction of earnings 
management by use of 
multilayer perceptron 
neural networks with 
two hidden layers in 
various industries 
Mahmoudi 
et al. (2016) 
There is a positive correlation between over 
monitoring and control of audit committees with 
the real earnings management 
Assessment of relation-
ship between audit 
committee features and 
real earnings manage-
ment of US companies  
Sun et al. 
(2014) 
Managerial caution while reducing conservatism 
accounting management, increases operational 
performance 
Evaluating the relation-
ship between manageri-
al caution, operational 
performance, and ac-
counting conservatism 
Hsieh et al. 
(2012) 
Increased auditors scrutiny by major audit; Re-
duces the flexibility of the company's accounting 
practices; Audited companies by large account-
ing firms are likely to manipulate the actual ac-
tivities 
Evaluating the relation-
ship between presence 
of large audit firms and 
high reputation with an 
increase in the actual 
management earning 
Qi et al. 
(2011)  
Managers at seasonal stock often involve in The two types of earn-Cohen & 
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Key findings Purpose Author(s) 
(Year) 
management of actual earning and yield loss dur-
ing the seasonal offerings in stock has increase as 
a result of earnings management through actual 
activities to manage earnings through accrual 
anomaly, because manipulating real activities has 
real economic consequences. 
ings management Zarowin 
(2010) 
Earnings management cause decrease predictive 
power of earnings. However, Once in different 
deciles, earnings management sizes, predictabil-
ity is measured, the results show that in the decile 
with the highest level of earnings management, 
not only predictable earning will not decrease, 
but the results of this group can be seen that the 
behavior of earnings management awareness. 
Examining the effect of 
earnings management 
on earnings forecast  
Chang et al. 
(2010) 
Method to manipulate profits through real activi-
ties in five group 
1. Save money on research and development ex-
penses 
2. Savings in administrative, general and selling 
costs  
3.Changes in the timing of withdrawal of long-
term assets and investments 
4. Discount to increase sales and ultimately 
5. Overproduction to reduce cost of sold goods, 
identify and classify 
Categorizing the earn-
ing manipulation meth-
ods 
Gunny 
(2010) 
 
Research hypothesis 
H: There is a significantly negative relationship between managerial caution 
and real earnings management. 
H1: there is a significantly negative relationship between managerial caution 
and changes of abnormal discretionary expenses in listed companies on 
Tehran Stock Exchange. 
H2: there is a significantly negative relationship between managerial caution 
and changes in abnormal production costs in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
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H3: there is a significantly negative relationship between managerial caution 
and abnormal changes in operating cash flows in listed companies in the 
Tehran Stock Exchange. 
 
Research Methodology 
This research, in terms of the correlation and methodology, is a quasi-
experimental study and is a positive research in accounting field which used 
actual data. Data related to hypotheses and variables has been extracted 
from financial statements, notes to the financial statements, and databases of 
the Tehran Securities Exchange. The period of conducting this study was 
year 2009 to year 2013. The spatial domain and the population of this re-
search are the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange that are selected 
according to the following conditions and restrictions: (i) The fiscal year 
ended March of each year, (ii) Company did not change its financial year 
during the 2009 to 2013, (iii) By the end of the fiscal year 2008 was ap-
proved on the Tehran Stock Exchange, and (iv) because of the different na-
ture of the activity does not constitute as investor companies and banks. 
 
Research Variables 
Managerial caution (TYPE): As mentioned in the theoretical foundations of 
research, in confronting with a situation of uncertainty, most companies to 
maintain its financial position and cash flows and trying to employee em-
ployability, optional expenses (based on the mechanism of precautionary 
savings) and reduce or maintain investment in capital assets (based on the 
mechanisms of available to investors in capital assets). In this study, the 
company has managerial caution that in one year out of the three above 
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steps, in which at least two actions simultaneously took place. In the follow-
ing sections, calculating the rate of change of this criterion is discussed. 
Fixing (Decreasing) the number of employees and reducing invest-
ments in capital assets: following the study by Hsieh et al. (2012) the three-
year weighted average number of employees and investments in capital as-
sets, is intended basis for measuring the reduction or failure to reduce the 
number of employees and investments in capital asset. Two dummy varia-
bles, i.e. INV and EMP, are defined for this purpose and the weighted aver-
age number of employees and investments in capital asset in three years be-
fore t years in any company, to be deducted of the number of employees and 
investments in capital assets in the year t, if obtained number is negative, 
EMP and INV dummy variables are assumption equal to one and otherwise 
will be zero. 
Equatation1. Δ    =     
                    
 
 
Δ   : is Changes in the number of employees or investment in capital assets  
CP: The number of employees or investment that is calculated in capital as-
sets for the three consecutive years, i.e. t to t-3. 
Reduction of discretionary expenses: Based on the mechanism for 
precautionary savings, companies which face uncertainty significantly in-
crease precautionary savings and the only way to achieve this goal is de-
creasing the discretionary expenses. Similar to a research conducted by Roy 
Chowdhury (2004), the following model is used to estimate abnormal dis-
cretionary expenses, separately in each industry. 
     
    
⁄  =   +    (1/    ) +    (    /    ) +        
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      : Total discretionary expenses (advertising costs, research and devel-
opment, distribution, sales and administrative expenses) in year t. If there is 
no cost of research and development in a company, the value will be zero. 
〖A〗 _ (t-1): Total assets at year t-1 
  S_ (t-1): Sales in year t-1 
  ε_t: Remaining model 
Moreover, the abnormality level of discretionary expenses was 
measured based on regression. Then, by defining a dummy variable regres-
sion EXP trend was continued and if the remainder of this dummy variable 
was negative, this variable is assumed equal to one and otherwise, will be 
equal to zero. After the above steps, the company has managerial caution if 
at the same time in one year, has reduced two items of the three investments 
in capital assets, discretionary expenses and employment. In other words, 
two variables of three dummy variables- INV, EMP, and EXP- in company 
will be equal to one; otherwise it will not be participated in the managerial 
caution. Finally, a virtual variable- TYPE- is defined. If the company has 
managerial caution the value equals to one and otherwise equals to zero. 
Real Earnings Management: the dependent variable of this study is real 
earnings management, which is measured through three indicators of ab-
normal production costs (overproduction), abnormal discretionary expenses, 
and unusual changes in operating cash flow. In this study, according to the 
study by Cohen & Zarowin (2010), the following expected models for esti-
mating the indicators of earnings management through real activities had 
been used, so that the remaining models as an indicator of earnings man-
agement through real activities (the dependent variable) are entered into the 
original model: 
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Measuring abnormal production costs (Model 1): 
PRODit/TAit-1=   (1/TAit-1) +   (Salesit/Tait-1) +  ( Salesit/TAit-1)+  (
Salesit-1/TAit-1)+ it        
Measuring abnormal discretionary expenses (model 2): 
DISEXPit/TAit-1= 0(1/TAit-1) +   (Salesit/Tait-1)+  it                                
Measuring of Unusual operating cash flows (Model 3): 
CFOit/TAit-1=  0(1/TAit-1) +   (Salesit/Tait-1)+  ( Salesit/TAit-1)+  it                
In the above equitation 
    CFO: operating cash flows, TA: Total Assets, Sales: Sales changes, 
PROD: Production expenses (cost of sold goods plus changes in inventory), 
and DISEXP: Optional expenses (administrative costs and sales). 
Control variables: based on the described principles and the litera-
ture review, several variables to control other factors affecting earnings 
management through the company's actual activities are considered to be as 
follows: 
1. Firm size (Size, t): through logarithm of the market value of equity is cal-
culated at the end of the period. 
2. The ratio of market value to book value of equity (M / Bi, t). 
3. The company's financial leverage (LEVi, t): the ratio of debt to assets in 
the year t. 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
In this study, from Cohen & Zarowin's model (2010) was used to measure 
the earnings management through real activities and it seems that three cri-
teria of abnormal production expenses, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
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and abnormal operating cash flows have more applications. The general 
model is consistent with the hypothesis, as follows: 
H1: abnormal changes in production costs (overproduction), (Model Number 
4): 
ABCOST=            +  S      +       +  L     +                                             
H2: abnormal changes in optional expenses, (Model Number 5): 
DISEXP=            +  S      +       +  L     +                                                
H3: abnormal changes in operating cash flows, (Model No. 6): 
ABCASH=            +  S      +       +  L     +                     
Here; ABCOST: abnormal production expenses, DISEXP: abnormal discre-
tionary expenses and ABCASH: abnormal operating cash flow. 
 
Findings 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of independent variables and the de-
pendent variable, as well as the control variable related research hypotheses.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Median Mean Research 
variables 
0.039 0.003 0.280 0.047 0.057 abnormal discre-
tionary expenses 
0.049 0.001 1.003 0.034 0.043 abnormal produc-
tion expenses 
0.013 -0.336 0.651 0.014 0.029 Abnormal operat-
ing cash flow 
0.400 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.479 Managerial cau-
tion 
0.614 4.476 8.078 5.882 5.934 Frim size 
0.167 -0.439 1.549 0.108 0.123 Rate of return on 
assets 
0.236 0.096 2.153 0.664 0.676 Financial Lever-
age 
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To estimate the model and to choose the panel data and data compi-
lation methods, an integration capabilities test was used. Table 3 shows the 
results of the integration testing capabilities for the estimated model for the 
first hypothesis 
Table 3. Result of the integration capabilities - first hypothesis 
Test statistics Degree of freedom Significance 
9.301 (117.468) 0.000 
 
As Table 3 shows, the F statistic is significantly smaller than 0.05. 
Since the null hypothesis of integration testing capabilities is not accepted, 
so to choose one of the methods of fixed effects and random effects, 
Hausman's test had been used. Table 4 shows the results of the Hausman's 
test for the first hypothesis. 
Table 4. Results of Hausman's test- first hypothesis 
Chi-square statistics Degree of freedom Significance 
1.163 4 0.884 
 
As table 4 shows, the significant value of chi-square statistic is larg-
er than 0.05 that indicating the preferred using random effects panel data 
methods versus fixed effects. So, to estimate the related model of the first 
hypothesis was used of Random effects panel data methods that the results 
of the regression model are provided in Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 5. The results of the overall model - first hypothesis 
Coefficient of 
determination 
Adjusted coef-
ficient of de-
termination 
F statistic Statistical sig-
nificance F 
Durbin-
Watson statis-
tic 
0.627 0.603 18.451 0.000 1.872 
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As shown in Table 5, the amount of F-statistic and the significance 
level related to this statistic indicates that the statistical null hypothesis is 
rejected and the regression estimated model is significant. In this model, the 
coefficient of determination is equal to 0.627. It means that 62.7 percent of 
the dependent variable changes explained by the independent and control 
variables. Also, the Durbin-Watson statistic model, which is equal to 1/872, 
are located in distance between 1.500 and 2.500 and suggests that there is no 
correlation between the errors model. In the following presented results of 
the coefficients of the variables in Table 6 are explained. 
Table 6. The results of the partial factors - first hypothesis 
Variables Coefficients Standard error T statistic Significance 
Managerial caution -0.001 0.001 -0.589 0.025 
Firm size -0.026 0.002 -3.917 0.000 
Rate of return on assets 0.038 0.003 2.395 0.000 
Financial Leverage 0.025 0.001 3.694 0.000 
The coefficient C 0.192 0.023 3.181 0.000 
 
As one could see, the negative coefficient of the independent varia-
ble in this study suggests a negative impact of managerial caution on the 
abnormal discretionary expenses. A significant level related to t statistic of 
independent variable indicates that this relationship statistically is the signif-
icant level. Thus, the first hypothesis is accepted at 95 percent significant 
level. Coefficients and statistical significance level of t related to control 
variables indicated that the financial leverage and return on assets has a sig-
nificant positive correlation and the firm size has a significant negative cor-
relation with the abnormal discretionary expenses. 
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To estimate the model, first in order to choose one of the panel data 
methods and compilation data is used of integration testing capabilities. Ta-
ble 7 shows the results of the integration testing capabilities for estimates 
model for the second hypothesis. 
Table 7. Result of the integration capabilities - second hypothesis 
Test statistics Degree of freedom Significance 
15.071 (117.468) 0.000 
 
As Table 7 shows, the significant amount of statistics F is smaller 
than the 0/05 that shows superior using panel data methods against the inte-
grate data. Now to choose a method of fixed effects and random effects, the 
Hausman's test is used that the results of which are as follows: 
Table 8. Results of the Hausman's test - second hypothesis 
Chi-square statistics Degree of freedom Significance 
3.076 4 0.131 
 
As Table 8 shows, the significant value of chi-square statistic is 
larger than 0/05 that indicating the preferred using random effects panel data 
methods versus fixed effects. So, to estimate the related model of the first 
hypothesis was used of Random effects panel data model that the results of 
the regression model are provided in Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9. Results of overall model - second hypothesis 
Coefficient of 
determination 
Adjusted coeffi-
cient of determi-
nation 
F statistic Statistical sig-
nificance F 
Durbin-
Watson sta-
tistic 
0.565 0.534 20.393 0.000 2.093 
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As seen in Table 9, the amount of F-statistic and the significance 
level related to this statistic indicates that the statistical null hypothesis that 
is the same meaningless entire model (zero of all coefficients) is rejected 
and the regression estimated model is significant. In this model, the coeffi-
cient of determination is equal to 0.565. It means that 56/5 percent of the 
dependent variable changes explained by the independent and control varia-
bles. Also, the Durbin-Watson statistic model, which is equal to 2.093, that 
suggests that there is no correlation between the errors model. In the follow-
ing, the results of the coefficients of the variables that presented in Table 10 
are explained. 
Table 10. Results of the partial factors - second hypothesis 
Variables Coefficients Standard error T statistic Significance 
Managerial caution -0.006 0.003 -0.293 0.038 
Firm size -0.073 0.055 -1.325 0.185 
Rate of return on assets 0.458 0.111 2.123 0.000 
Financial Leverage 0.468 0.090 1.337 0.000 
The coefficient C 0.711 0.339 2.093 0.036 
 
As one can see, the negative coefficient of the independent variable 
in this study suggests the negative impact of managerial caution on the ab-
normal production expenses. The significant level related to t statistic of in-
dependent variable indicates that this relationship statistically is in the sig-
nificant level. Thus, the second hypothesis is accepted at 95 percent signifi-
cant level. Coefficients and statistical significance level of t related to con-
trol variables indicated that the financial leverage and return on assets has a 
significant positive correlation with abnormal production expenses but firm 
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size has a significant negative correlation with the abnormal production ex-
penses. 
In order to choose one of the panel data methods and compilation 
data the integration capability test was used. Table 11 shows the results of 
the integration capability test for estimated model for the third hypothesis.  
Table 11. Result of the integration capabilities - third hypothesis 
Test statistics Degree of freedom Significance 
8.760 (117.468) 0.000 
 
As Table 11 shows, the significant value of chi-square statistic is 
smaller than 0.05 that indicating the priority of using Random effects panel 
data methods versus Data integration method. Since the null hypothesis of 
integration capability test has not accepted, so to choose one of the methods 
of fixed effects and random effects, Hausman's test was used. Table 12 
shows the results of the Hausman's test for the first hypothesis. 
Table 12. Hausman's test results - third hypothesis 
Chi-square statistics Degree of freedom Significance 
2.853 4 0.000 
 
As Table 12 shows, the significant value of chi-square statistic is 
smaller than 0.05 that indicating the preferred using Random effect panel 
data methods versus Random effects. So, to estimate the related model of 
the first hypothesis, Random effects panel data method was used that the 
results of the regression model are provided in Tables 13 and 14. 
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Table 13. Results of the overall model – third hypothesis 
Coefficient of de-
termination 
Adjusted coefficient 
of determination 
F statis-
tic 
Statistical sig-
nificance F 
Durbin-
Watson sta-
tistic 
0.541 0.508 10.258 0.001 2.236 
 
As seen in Table 13, the amount of F-statistic and the significance 
level related to this statistic indicates that the statistical null hypothesis that 
is the same meaningless entire model (zero all coefficients) is rejected and 
the regression estimated model is significant. In this model, the coefficient 
of determination is equal to 0.541. It means that 54.1 percent of the depend-
ent variable changes explained by the independent and control variables. 
Also, the Durbin-Watson statistic model, which is equal to 2.236, is located 
in distance between 1.500 and 2.500 and suggests that there is no correlation 
between the errors of model. In the following the results of the coefficients 
of the variables that presented in Table 14 are explained. 
 
Table 14. Results of the partial factors - third hypothesis 
Variables Coefficients Standard er-
ror 
T statistic Significant 
Managerial cau-
tion 
-0.001 0.008 -0.163 0.025 
Firm size -0.003 0.001 -0.153 0.020 
Rate of return on 
assets 
0.028 0.023 1.465 0.000 
Financial Lever-
age 
-0.027 0.024 -1.104 0.0026 
The coefficient C 0.122 0.058 2.084 0.037 
Journal of Entrepreneurship, Business, and Economics, 2017, 5(2), 127–146 
145 
As you can see, the negative coefficient of the independent variable 
in this study suggests a negative impact of managerial caution on the ab-
normal operating cash flows. A significant level related to t statistic of inde-
pendent variable indicates that this relationship statistically is in the signifi-
cant level. Thus, the third hypothesis is accepted at 95 percent significant 
level. Coefficients and significance level of statistical t related to control 
variables indicated that the rate of return on assets has a significant positive 
correlation with firm size and the financial leverage has a negative and sig-
nificant relationship with abnormal operating cash flows. 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the results of the our analysis in this study, the significant and 
negative relationship between managerial caution with abnormal discretion-
ary expenses, as well as between abnormal operating cash flows and abnor-
mal production expenses were approved, and none of the hypotheses were 
rejected. Finally, according to the hypotheses testing and based on the main 
hypothesis of this study, it can be concluded that there is a significantly 
negative relationship between managerial caution and earnings management 
through real activities. This means that, in the period of the research, the 
companies that have benefited from precautions management showed less 
interest to use real earnings management practices and its use has shown 
that using managerial caution led to reduction of earnings management 
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